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Abstract 
Voters often split tickets, voting for candidates from different parties in simultaneous elections. In this 
paper, I apply a political agency framework with implicit incentives to study ticket splitting in 
simultaneous municipal and regional elections. I show that ticket splitting is a natural outcome of the 
optimal reelection scheme adopted by voters to motivate politicians' efforts in a retrospective voting 
environment. I assume that an office-motivated politician (mayor or governor) prefers her counterpart 
to be affiliated with the same political party. This correlation of incentives leads the voters to adopt a 
joint performance evaluation rule, which is conditioned on the politicians belonging to the same party 
or different parties. The model is dynamic, generating predictions of split-ticket voting over time. I 
show that ticket splitting is less likely than electing candidates from the same party, but somewhat 
depends on ticket splitting in the previous period. Ticket splitting is also more likely in smaller 
municipalities, where the party affiliation of a mayor is assumed to be of less importance to the 
governor. These theoretical results are consistent with empirical evidence from simultaneous municipal 
and regional elections held in Spain. 
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1. Introduction
Split-ticket voting, when a citizen votes for candidates from di¤erent parties in simultaneous
elections, is a common feature of modern political systems. Ticket splitting has mostly been
studied in the context of the US, where simultaneous presidential and congressional elections
are held every four years (see Burden and Kimball 2002, Fiorina 1996, Jacobson 1990, and
Zupan 1991, among many others).
The literature has produced several formal models of split-ticket voting. For example,
Alesina and Rosenthal (1995, 1996) elaborated on the policy balancing argument, showing
that citizens strategically split tickets to avoid the extreme policies that may arise when the
executive and legislative branches are allied. Chari et al. (1997) built a model based on
the budgetary externality of concentrated government spending nanced by uniform taxes.
They found that voters prefer a scally conservative president (to restrain overall spending)
but scally liberal congressmen (to promote spending in their home districts). Bugarin
(2003) showed that voters control executive corruption by splitting tickets, thereby reinforcing
opposition in the legislature. Fox and Van Weelden (2010) proposed an alternative rationale
for ticket splitting based on the need for e¤ective oversight of the executive. Note that all
these models explain ticket splitting in the same specic institutional setting, where the nal
policy outcome is determined jointly by the executive and legislative branches of government.
This paper complements the aforementioned literature by analyzing ticket splitting at lower
levels of government (municipal and regional) where other institutional settings are possible.
As a rule, mayors and governors face distinct well-dened tasks and are elected to implement
distinct specic policies.
In this paper, I apply an implicit incentive approach to explain ticket splitting within
a retrospective voting model (i.e., a political agency model with moral hazard). In my
framework, split-ticket voting arises as an outcome of the optimal implicit reward scheme
voters use to induce politicians e¤orts. The model is dynamic, generating predictions of
ticket splitting over time. This feature is original; none of the aforementioned contributions
has analyzed ticket splitting in a dynamic context.
I consider a representative municipality in a region where the mayoral and gubernatorial
elections are simultaneous. I work with the two settings: one with a single large city whose
vote is decisive for the outcome of the regional election, and one with many cities of varying
size. In the latter case, each city has a probability proportional to its population of playing
a pivotal role in the regional election.
I use a political agency model of interaction between politicians and their constituency
2
in the presence of a moral hazard problem. The politicians want to be reelected for another
term, and are held accountable for their past performance at the moment of election. The
politicians therefore have incentives to satisfy the voterswishes. In addition, I assume that
the politicians are loyal to their respective political parties: the mayor prefers the governor
to be a¢ liated with the same political party, and vice versa.1 Hence, the incentives of the
mayor and governor are correlated. The voters care about the politicians performances,
which are observable but not contractible. The voters evaluate the incumbentsperformance
and vote accordingly. More precisely, the voters employ implicit evaluation rules when decid-
ing whether to reward (reelect) politicians. Obviously, voters can inuence the politicians
behavior through their choice of evaluation rules. I restrict the space of possible evalua-
tion rules to linear functions of performance. The evaluation rules are also required to be
sequentially rational.
I show that given the correlation between the two politiciansincentives, voters are better
o¤ adopting a joint performance evaluation rule (conditioned on the incumbents belonging to
the same party or di¤erent parties) rather than an individual politician performance evalua-
tion rule. In particular, the voters evaluate the performance of the mayor and governor from
the same party as a team. If the mayor and governor belong to di¤erent parties, then the
voters compare their performances to create a competitive environment. This combination of
rules implies that improved performance increases a politicians own reelection probability,
while increasing/decreasing the reelection probability of her partisan ally/rival in the other
o¢ ce. Politicians therefore have extra incentives to perform better, for the sake of their party
as well as for themselves.
In equilibrium, the reelection outcomes of incumbents from the same party are therefore
positively correlated: voters tend to reward both incumbents from a well-performing party, or
punish both incumbents from a poorly-performing party. The reelection outcomes of incum-
bents from di¤erent parties are negatively correlated: voters tend to reward the incumbent
from the better-performing party while punishing the other incumbent. This combination
generates a dynamic of partisan voting: whether or not the incumbent politicians belong to
the same party, ticket splitting is always less likely than electing both candidates from the
same party.
Next I consider two cases of politicianspreferences, given that all politicians prefer to
1Fox and Van Weelden (2010) introduce a similar assumption about the partisan preferences of the legis-
lature. In particular, in their career concerns setup the legislature ("overseer") can care about the executives
reputation. For example, a partisan overseer may seek to damage the reputation of an executive from the
other party while seeking to protect the reputation of an executive from her own party.
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work with candidates from their own party. First, a mayor/governor might prefer the other
o¢ ce to be held by a known incumbent rather than a new politician. Allied incumbents
therefore have an extra incentive to perform well so that they continue working together.
This preference implies that politicians from the same party exert a higher total e¤ort than
politicians from di¤erent parties. In this case the voters adopt a joint performance evaluation
rule, which results in the reelection outcomes of allied incumbents being somewhat more
correlated in absolute value compared with the outcomes of incumbents from di¤erent parties.
Ticket splitting is therefore more likely in elections where the incumbents belong to di¤erent
parties, a consequence of ticket splitting in the previous period.
The second possibility is that politicians have a preference for new allies over incumbent
allies. In this case incumbents from the same party have a somewhat weaker incentive to
perform well, and the total e¤ort of an allied government is likely to be less than that of
a divided government. The joint reelection outcomes for politicians from the same party
are then less correlated (in absolute value) than the outcomes for politicians from di¤erent
parties. Ticket splitting is thus more likely in elections where the incumbents belong to the
same party, i.e., where voters did not split tickets in the previous period.
These results rest on the assumption of politiciansparty loyalty ; that is, I assumed that
a mayor/governor cares about the party a¢ liation of the governor/mayor. The joint perfor-
mance evaluation rules then give extra implicit incentives to the politicians. If I relax the
assumption of party loyalty, this e¤ect vanishes and the voters no longer evaluate incumbents
jointly. Instead they use a cut-o¤ rule that each incumbent is reappointed only when her
individual performance exceeds a critical threshold. In this situation, the probability of ticket
splitting goes up.
Furthermore, I assume that the mayors party a¢ liation is of less importance in smaller
municipalities. This may happen for two reasons: the mayors are more likely to run as in-
dependents (or be a¢ liated with a minor party) and the constituencies already know the
candidates very well. (Recall that one of the major roles of political parties is to provide in-
formation about unknown politicians.) Thus, a governor cares less about the party a¢ liation
of small-town mayors. As a result, the two politiciansincentives are less correlated. In this
situation, the incumbents are more likely to be evaluated individually rather than jointly,
which increases the probability of ticket splitting.
My model therefore predicts several testable patterns of voting in simultaneous two-party
elections.
1. The reelection outcomes of mayors and governors from the same party are positively
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correlated, while the outcomes of mayors and governors from di¤erent parties are neg-
atively correlated.
2. Ticket splitting is less likely than a vote for candidates from the same party.
3. The probability of ticket splitting is conditional upon ticket splitting in the previous
period.
4. Ticket splitting is more likely to occur in small municipalities than in large ones.
In order to illustrate the model, I estimate the mayors and governors reelection proba-
bilities and the ticket splitting probability using panel data on simultaneous municipal and
regional elections held in Spain between 1983 to 2007. The predictions outlined above are
consistent with the results of this empirical analysis.
I turn now to the fundamental question of why political constitution is modeled as political
agency. Firstly, in addition to a sound theoretical framework, this approach has received
considerable empirical support (see, for example, Peltzman 1992 and Besley and Case 1995a,
1995b, 2003). Besley (2006) provides an excellent introduction to political agency models and
"emphasizes the empirical potential of these models in explaining real world policy choices."2
Secondly, I believe that at the municipal and regional levels politicianstasks require mainly
managerial skills. This view is supported by the empirical work of Ferreira and Gyourko
(2009), who found that in US cities the mayors party a¢ liation does not a¤ect the size of
the city government and the allocation of spending. In a recent article in the New York Times,
Glaeser points out that "lack of ideology has become a major feature of big city mayors...
They are... managerial mayors, appreciated by voters because they succeed in making the city
work."3 The political agency approach may therefore be appropriate to model local political
constitutions. Even so, elected politicians can only be o¤ered implicit incentive schemes;
public policies are di¢ cult to reward with explicit contracts.
The retrospective voting model I use goes back to Barro (1973). Ferejohn (1986) extended
the model and studied subgame-perfect equilibria rather than Nash equilibria. Persson et
al. (1997) use a retrospective voting approach to study rent extraction. In Austen-Smith
and Banks (1989) voters adopt retrospective voting strategies that are conditioned on the
di¤erence between the incumbents performance and her initial policy platform. Banks and
2Besley (2006), p. 3.
3Edward L. Glaeser "Lower (and More Realistic) Presidential Expectations," January 20, 2009. Available
online at http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/01/20/lower-and-more-realistic-presidential-expectations/
(accessed January 26, 2009).
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Sundaram (1993, 1996) analyze retrospective voting settings with both moral hazard and
adverse selection, and with term limits respectively.
The results of this paper are also related to the literature on horizontal and vertical
intergovernmental competition. Most analyses of horizontal competition are based on the
assumption of interjurisdictional mobility of consumers, à la Tiebout (1956). In a similar vein,
the literature on yardstick competition between jurisdictions started with the seminal work
of Salmon (1987), to be followed by Besley and Case (1995a), Bordignon et al. (2004), Sand-
Zantman (2004), Belleamme and Hindriks (2005), Besley and Smart (2007) and others. The
main assumption of this literature is that under decentralization, voters use a comparative
performance evaluation between di¤erent local governments to create yardstick competition.
The vertical competition literature, on the other hand, assumes that "senior and junior
governments provide similar or comparable services, and that o¢ ce-holders in the government
which is judged by citizens to be the more e¢ cient supplier will increase their probability of
getting the vote of these citizens"4 (see Breton 1996, Breton and Fraschini 2003, Breton and
Salmon 2001, Volden 2005 and Volden 2007). I follow these authors in assuming that voters
compare the performance of local and regional governments, and are likely to reward the
more e¢ cient politicians with reelection. There is, however, an important di¤erence between
my research and the papers just cited. In the intergovernmental competition literature, the
comparative performance evaluation result is driven by either correlated shocks or interjuris-
dictional spillover. In my model, the joint performance evaluation arises from the fact that
the politiciansincentives are correlated: each one cares not only about her own reelection
prospects, but also about the success of other politicians a¢ liated with the same political
party.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 lays out a model of ticket
splitting in one large city pivotal to the regional election. Section 3 presents a model of ticket
splitting in a region with many small cities. Section 4 provides an empirical illustration with
data on Spanish elections. Finally, Section 5 concludes.
2. Ticket Splitting in a Large City
In this section I study ticket splitting in simultaneous municipal and regional elections held
in a large city. I assume that the city is large enough that its vote will be decisive for the
regional election.
Consider a large city, with an innite horizon, that has to elect mayorM (for the municipal
4Breton and Salmon (2001), p. 139.
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government) and governor G (for the region to which this city belongs). The city is inhabited
by a large number (formally a continuum) of individuals. The individuals live forever. At
the beginning of each period, the elections take place simultaneously and the winners are
determined by majority rule. Politicians running for both o¢ ces belong to one of the two
political parties, L or R. I assume that there is exactly one candidate from each partythe
incumbent and an opponentin each election and in each period. The opponents are identical
to the incumbents in all respects except party a¢ liation. The participation constraints of the
politicians are always satised, and there is no term limit.
First I will describe a stage game with a stationary environment, where time subscripts
can be dropped with no risk of confusion. I will then consider an innitely repeated game.
One stage is a sequential political agency game between politicians (the mayor and gov-
ernor) and their constituency (the voters). While in o¢ ce, each politician i 2 fM;Gg has
to implement a policy determined by her unobservable e¤ort ai.5 The set of e¤orts available
to each politician is taken to be a non-degenerate interval [0; a]  R. I assume that the
performance of politician i, pi, is observed with an independent and unobservable noise "i:
pi = ai + "i;
with "i  N
 
0; 2

.6
The reward of politician i is denoted by i (ai). E¤ort is costly, and I assume the standard
convex cost function a
2
i
2 .
7 The mayor and governor independently choose e¤ort levels ai to
maximize their utility, which is given by
i (ai)  a
2
i
2
:
The function i (ai) will be explicitly dened in subsection 2.1.
5One can add an adverse selection problem by assuming that policy outcomes are determined by e¤ort and
ability. The results are qualitatively the same if ability is modeled as a moving average (to capture the idea
that a policymakers competence changes slowly over time).
6 I have an extended version of the model, available upon request, where the two noise terms "M and "G
are correlated and follow a bivariate normal distribution. I want to concentrate however on the case where
voters introduce joint performance evaluation due to the correlation between politiciansincentives rather than
the correlation between shocks. The latter topic has been widely studied in the context of team evaluation
in contract theory (for an overview, see Bolton and Dewatripont 2005) and in the literature on yardstick
competition (see the references on yardstick competition in the Introduction).
7 I have an extended version of the model, available upon request, where the cost of policy implementation
for the mayor and governor from the same party is di¤erent than for the politicians from rival parties (e.g.,
because of synergy). The results of this extended model are qualitatively the same.
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There is no cost of voting, and I assume that there are no abstainers. The individuals
di¤er in their preferences over political parties. I assume that some individuals always prefer
party L to party R, and vote for candidates from party L in both elections. Likewise, other
individuals are loyal to party R. However, there is a large group of uncommitted individuals,
whose votes are decisive for the outcome of both elections. These voters care about the
politiciansperformances in each period according to a linear utility function
pM + pG:
In what follows, I refer to this group of decisive voters simply as "the voters".
I assume that the voters coordinate to apply the same retrospective reappointment rules
to reelect the incumbents. I follow the literature (e.g. Persson et al. 1997) in restricting the
strategy space such that the voters base their reappointment decision solely on the politicians
performances in the current period, not in any previous period. See Persson et al. (1997)
for a discussion of the plausibility of this approach, and Fair (1978) and Kramer (1971) for
empirical ndings in its favor.
Denote by S the state where mayor M and governor G are members of the same party
(either L or R), and by D the state where M and G belong to di¤erent parties. State S and
state D occur when in the previous period the voters did not split or split tickets respectively.
The timing of events in the stage game is as follows. First, state S or D is realized.
Second, the voters decide on the reappointment rules to be used in the coming elections.
Third, the politicians exert e¤orts aM and aG. Fourth, the politiciansperformances pM and
pG are observed. Finally, both elections take place simultaneously and the voters apply the
selected reappointment rules to reward or punish the incumbents.
In the following subsection I describe the politicianspreferences. I will then turn to the
votersproblem and dene an equilibrium concept.
2.1. Politicians
The politicianspreferences are as follows. First, once elected, mayor M and governor G
want to be reelected in the next period. Moreover, M wants to improve her partys chances
to win the governors o¢ ce in the coming election. If G and M belong to the same party,
then M prefers G to be reelected. Otherwise, M wants the voters to appoint a new governor
(from her own party) for the next term. Likewise, G wants M to be reelected if they are
members of the same party, and wants the opponent to be appointed if M is from the
rival party. The value of holding o¢ ce is normalized to 1. The values, which M and G
associate to their partiesholding the other o¢ ce, are denoted by M and 

G respectively.
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Furthermore, denote by Pri () the probability of being reelected to o¢ ce i 2 fM;Gg in the
coming election. Therefore, politician i has the following reward function i : [0; a]
2 ! R
that depends continuously on both politicianse¤orts:
i (ai; aj) =
8<: Pri (ai; aj) + 
S
i Prj (ai; aj) if S
Pri (ai; aj) + 
D
i (1  Prj (ai; aj)) if D;
where i; j 2 fM;Gg and j 6= i. The preferences stated above reect the politicians al-
legiance to their respective parties; individual politicians care about their partys overall
representation in mayor and governor o¢ ces, not just their own reelection prospects.8 Still,
the reasonable assumption here is that a mayor/governor values her own o¢ ce more than her
partys representation in the other o¢ ce; i.e., 0  i  1.9 I call i the degree of politician
is loyalty to her party (or the strength of her party alignment). I consider two cases of
politicianspreferences. If there is some preference for incumbents over unknown candidates,
then Si  Di . This case reects the idea that a mayor/governor might prefer an incumbent
ally to an unknown ally for the other o¢ ce. If politicians prefer newcomers, then Si < 
D
i .
In this case a mayor/governor would like a new ally (a newcomer) to be elected for the other
o¢ ce.
The model can be generalized to the case where the incumbents maximize their intertem-
poral utility function (as in Ferejohn 1986). At this stage, however, I want to concentrate
on the interactions between politicians and voters. I therefore assume, as in Alesina and
Tabellini (2008), that the incumbents are myopic: they care about reelection only in the next
period, not in any subsequent period.
2.2. Voters
The politiciansperformances pM and pG (but not their composition between e¤ort and noise)
are observed at the end of each period but are not contractible. Public policies are di¢ cult
to reward with explicit contracts. It is more natural to use implicit incentive contracting in
this situation. I assume that the voters coordinate on the same retrospective voting rule, and
that there is no coordination failure among the voters. A coordination problem is a serious
issue, but lies beyond the scope of the paper.
8Alternatively, the stated preferences could arise because the mayor and governor have to interact while in
o¢ ce. Each prefers working with a member of her own party rather than a rival.
9 In other words, politician i does not mind reducing her reelection chances by 1% in exchange for increasing
her allys election probability by 1
i
%  1%.
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The voters observe politiciansperformances pM and pG, and in the coming elections they
reward incumbents according to their performances in the current period; i.e., they reappoint
incumbents who have shown "good" results in the current period. A politician thrown out
of o¢ ce is never reappointed. In this case an opponent from the rival party is elected.
Obviously the voters can inuence the politiciansbehavior through their choice of evalua-
tion rules. Intuitively, since politicians care about each othersreelection chances, the reward
rules should allow for joint performance evaluation. Under joint performance evaluation the
voters condition politician is reelection on her own performance pi (giving her an incentive
to perform well since she wants to be reelected) and on the performance pj of politician j
(giving an incentive to politician j since he cares about is reelection chances).
I restrict the functional space of performance evaluation rules to linear joint evaluation
rules (M ; bM ) and (G; bG). M and G are the slopes of the mayor and governor evaluation
rules respectively, while bM and bG are the corresponding intercepts; M ; G; bM ; bG 2 R,
MG  1. Under rules (i; bi), i 2 fM;Gg, the probability of being reelected for o¢ ce i is
Pri (ai; aj) = P (fpi (ai) + ipj (aj)  big)
with i; j 2 fM;Gg and j 6= i. Figure 2.1 depicts the possible outcomes for M and G under
rules (M ; bM ) and (G; bG) in the two-dimensional space of observed performances pM and
pG. Note that I require MG  1, so that line pM + MpG = bM is steeper than line
pG + GpM = bG. Otherwise, as one can see from Figure 2.1, a mayor and governor with
poor performance would be reelected while politicians with better performance would not.
Note that under linear rules (M ; bM ) and (G; bG), Ms reelection is determined by
random variable "M + M"G  N
 
0;
 
1 + 2M

2

, and Gs reelection is determined by
random variable "G + G"M  N
 
0;
 
1 + 2G

2

. I say that the two reelection events are
independent when M = 0 and G = 0, positively correlated when M > 0 and G > 0, and
negatively correlated when M < 0 and G < 0.
Since di¤erentiable functions are linear in rst-order approximation, the restriction to
linear rules gives an approximate t to more general evaluation rules. Furthermore, the
linear evaluation rules allow for a closed-form solution. Linear approximation methods are
widely used in macroeconomics to search for time-consistent equilibria (e.g. Krusell et al.
1997). In the contract theory literature, linear contracts have been shown to be optimal
under some realistic assumptions (for an overview, see Bolton and Dewatripont 2005).
As I mentioned above, in this framework split-ticket voting emerges naturally from the
chosen evaluation rules. That is, following the chosen rules can result in the election of
politicians from di¤erent parties. Henceforth I will nd it more convenient to refer to S
10
Figure 2.1: Mayor M and governor G reelection outcomes under linear rules (M ; bM ) and
(G; bG) in the two-dimensional space of performances pM and pG.
and D as the states characterized by the politicians belonging to the same party or di¤erent
parties, keeping in mind that state S or state D occurs when the voters did not split tickets
or split tickets respectively.
2.3. Equilibrium Concept
In the stage game I search for a subgame perfect equilibrium by analyzing the game back-
wards. First, I solve for the politicianse¤orts aM and aG under rules (M ; bM ) and (G; bG).
Second, I examine the voters choice of evaluation rules (M ; bM ) and (G; bG). In what
follows I introduce two denitions.
Given linear performance evaluation rules (M ; bM ) and (G; bG), the equilibrium in e¤ort
strategies is a prole of e¤orts (aeM ; a
e
G) such that
i
 
aei ; a
e
j
  ae2i
2
 i
 
ai; a
e
j
  a2i
2
for each ai 2 [0; a] ;
where i; j 2 fM;Gg, i 6= j.
The voters are rational, so they realize that the only alternative to reelecting incumbents
is voting for opponents from rival parties. The politiciansperformances are additively sepa-
rable in e¤ort and noise, and all politicians behave in the same way irrespective of the noise.
If elected, opponent i will exert equilibrium e¤ort aei , which maximizes her expected util-
ity. Thus, the voters compare the incumbentsperformances with their opponentsexpected
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performances and vote accordingly. Formally,
bi = a
e
i + ia
e
j :
Thus, the linear joint performance evaluation rules are solely determined by slopes i and
j .
I dene an equilibrium in rule strategies as the pair (M ; 

G) such that
aeM (

M ; 

G) + a
e
G (

M ; 

G) = max
M ;G
MG1
aeM (M ; G) + a
e
G (M ; G) ;
where (aeM () ; aeG ()) is an equilibrium in e¤ort strategies. Finally, the politiciansequilibrium
e¤orts are denoted by ai  aei
 
i ; 

j

, i; j 2 fM;Gg, i 6= j.
Now consider an innitely repeated game where each stage is the sequential political
agency game presented above. First, recall that the reappointment decision depends only on
the politiciansperformances in the current period and not in any previous period. Second,
recall that the incumbents are "myopic": they care about reelection only in the next period
and not in any subsequent period. Under these assumptions on the votersstrategy space and
the politicianspreferences, I consider a Markov Perfect Equilibrium of the innitely repeated
game where a stage game equilibrium in rule strategies is replicated innitely often. The
payo¤-relevant states are S (politicians are a¢ liated with the same party) and D (politicians
are a¢ liated with di¤erent parties).
I must stress here that the evaluation rules are required to be sequentially rational; no
precommitment is allowed. The model parameters are common knowledge, so the politicians
know whether the voters used the evaluation rules that had been rational for them in the
previous period or deviated. In the latter case, the politicians conclude that the voters
reappoint incumbents randomly or use unknown rules that are not based on performance. As
a result, from that period onward, the politicians will exert zero e¤ort to minimize their costs.
The voters know this, so they have no incentives to deviate and always reward incumbents
according to the chosen rules.
2.4. Equilibrium
First, consider one stage game. Let the voters use evaluation rules (i; bi) such that bi =
aei + ia
e
j . Under these rules the politician is utility is
i (ai; aj)  a
2
i
2
=
12
8<: P (fpi (ai) + ipj (aj)  big) + 
S
i P
 
pj (aj) + jpi (ai)  bj
	  a2i2 if S
P (fpi (ai) + ipj (aj)  big) + Di
 
1  P  pj (aj) + jpi (ai)  bj	  a2i2 if D:
Politician i chooses e¤ort ai before observing realization of the noise, and takes the voters
expectations as given. Figure 2.2 depicts the politiciansbest response functions in states S
and D for three scenarios: independent reelection outcomes with i = 0 and j = 0 (black),
positively correlated reelection outcomes with i > 0 and j > 0 (red), and negatively
correlated reelection outcomes with i < 0 and j < 0 (blue). Note that for independent
reelection outcomes (black) the best responses are at in both states (since each politicians
reelection depends only on her own e¤ort). For positively correlated reelection outcomes
(red) the best responses shift upwards in state S and downwards in state D. Intuitively,
under positively correlated reelections a politician has extra incentive to exert e¤ort in state
S (to increase her allys reelection chances) and less incentive in state D (to avoid helping
her rival get reelected). Finally, for negatively correlated reelection outcomes (blue) the best
responses shift downwards in state S and upwards in state D. In this scenario a politician
does not want to damage her allys reelection prospects, so exerts a lower e¤ort in state S.
However, in state D she has extra incentive to work harder and reduce her rivals reelection
chances.
Note that there is a free-riding e¤ect under positively correlated reelection outcomes in
state S. Intuitively, politician i might prefer to exert a lower e¤ort (and reduce e¤ort cost)
if her partisan ally j is performing well enough to improve her reelection prospects.
The result below establishes the existence of an equilibrium in e¤ort strategies. Proofs of
this and other propositions are given in the Appendix.
Proposition 1. Under linear performance evaluation rules M and G with MG  1,
there exists an equilibrium in e¤ort strategies (aeM ; a
e
G) given by
aei =
8>>>>><>>>>>:
1p
2
 
1p
1+2i
+
Si jq
1+2j
!
if S
1p
2
 
1p
1+2i
  
D
i jq
1+2j
!
if D;
where i; j 2 fM;Gg, i 6= j.
Turn now to the voterschoice of evaluation rules M and G. Maximizing a
e
M +a
e
G with
respect to M and G yields an equilibrium in rule strategies (

M ; 

G). I summarize the
results in the following proposition (the proof is straightforward).
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Figure 2.2: Best response functions of politicians i and j for independent reelections (black),
positively correlated reelections (red) and negatively correlated reelections (blue) in states S
and D.
Proposition 2. There exists an equilibrium in rule strategies (M ; 

G) given by
i =
8<: 
S
j if S
 Dj if D;
(2.1)
where i; j 2 fM;Gg, i 6= j. The politiciansequilibrium e¤orts ai are equal to
ai =
8>>>>><>>>>>:
1p
2
 
1q
1+(Sj )
2
+
(Si )
2q
1+(Si )
2
!
if S
1p
2
 
1q
1+(Dj )
2
+
(Di )
2q
1+(Di )
2
!
if D:
(2.2)
According to Proposition 2, if politician j is loyal to her political party (i.e., j 6= 0), the
voters adopt a joint performance evaluation rule to reelect politician i. The probability of
being reelected to o¢ ce i under the joint rule is equal to
Pri (ai; aj) =
8><>:
P
n
pi (ai) + 
S
j pj (aj)  ai + Sj aj
o
if S
P
n
pi (ai)  Dj pj (aj)  ai   Dj aj
o
if D:
Intuitively, the incentives of a mayor and governor are correlated, because they care about the
overall representation of their party in both o¢ ces. The voters therefore reward politicians
jointly rather than separately.
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If the politicians belong to the same political party (state S), then the voters use a joint
rule under which the reelection of politician i is positively correlated with the performance
of politician j (i > 0). As a result, the voters evaluate the performance of the politicians
from the same party as a team and tend to reward the incumbents from a well-performing
party while punish the incumbents from a badly-performing party.
However, if the politicians belong to di¤erent parties (state D), the voters use a joint
rule under which the reelection of politician i is negatively correlated with the performance
of politician j (i < 0). As a result, the voters compare the performance of one politician to
that of the other, creating a competitive environment between the parties. In this scenario
the voters tend to reward the incumbent from the better-performing party, while punishing
the incumbent from the worse-performing party.
In sum, due to the correlation between the mayors and governor incentives such that
they care about their party chances of holding o¢ ce, the voters are better o¤ adopting party
performance evaluation rather than individual performance evaluation.
Furthermore, the more loyal politician j is to her political party (the higher j is), the more
correlated the optimal reward scheme for politician i is with the performance of politician j
(positively if S or negatively if D). Intuitively, if the politicians care equally about their own
reelection chances and their partys election chances, then the best reward scheme would be
perfectly correlated: in state S the incumbents are always reelected or dismissed together,
while in state D reelection of one implies dismissal of the other.
The less loyal the politicians are to their political parties, the less correlated their in-
centives. As a result, the voters adopt the less correlated reelection rules in equilibrium.
If politician j is not at all loyal to her political party (j = 0), then the optimal rule to
reappoint politician i is a simple cut-o¤ rule: she is reappointed only if her observed perfor-
mance exceeds a critical threshold given by the equilibrium e¤ort for this o¢ ce. That is, the
probability of being reelected to o¢ ce i depends only on ai:
Pri (ai) = P (fpi (ai)  ai g) :
Intuitively, when politicians care only about their own reelection prospects, the voters are
better o¤ rewarding politicians individual performance rather than the partys performance.
Next, compare the equilibrium e¤orts of politicians from the same party and from di¤erent
parties, as given in (2.2). If there is some preference for incumbents (i.e., Si  Di ) then
politicians from the same party exert a higher total e¤ort than politicians from di¤erent
parties:
(aM + a

G) jS  (aM + aG) jD if SM  DM and SG  DG :
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Intuitively, allied politicians have extra incentive to exert greater e¤ort (thereby increasing
the probability of their counterpartsreelection).
If a mayor and governor prefer newcomers (i.e., Si < 
D
i ) then politicians from the same
party have less incentive to perform well. So politicians from the same party exert a lower
total e¤ort than politicians from di¤erent parties:
(aM + a

G) jS < (aM + aG) jD if SM < DM and SG < DG :
How do the equilibrium e¤orts ai in (2.2) depend on parametersvalues? First, larger
variance of noise 2 decreases the politicianse¤orts. Intuitively, more randomness in the
observed performances pM and pG makes the reelection probabilities less sensitive to e¤ort,
reducing the politiciansincentives. Second, if politician is party alignment i is strength-
ened, the equilibrium e¤ort of politician i, ai increases while that of politician j, a

j decreases.
The more politician i cares about her allys appointment to o¢ ce j, the more incentives she
has to perform better. However, this weakens politician js incentives to exert e¤ort, because
his reelection becomes less sensitive to his own e¤ort.
In the innitely repeated game, one can show that there exists a Markov Perfect Equilib-
rium such that in each stage the votersrule strategies are given by (2.1) and the politicians
e¤orts are given by (2.2).
2.5. Dynamics
In this section I calculate the equilibrium probabilities of transition between state S (where
the politicians are members of the same party) and state D (where the politicians belong to
di¤erent parties). I denote by Pkl the probability that a city in state k will shift to state l in
the next period, k; l 2 fS;Dg. I establish the following result.
Proposition 3. The matrix of the equilibrium one-step transition probabilities between
states S and D is24PSS PSD
PDS PDD
35 =
264 12 + 1 arctan 
S
M+
S
G
1 SMSG
1
2   1 arctan
SM+
S
G
1 SMSG
1
2 +
1
 arctan
DM+
D
G
1 DMDG
1
2   1 arctan
DM+
D
G
1 DMDG
375
where arctan () is the arctangent function.
Note that independently of the current state, the next state is more likely to be S than
D. Indeed, the probability of the next state being a split-ticket state is never greater than 12 :
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Figure 2.3: Politiciansreelection outcomes under equilibrium rules M and 

G in states S
and D.
PD 2

0; 12

. The intuition for this result is as follows. If the politicians currently belong to
the same party (state S), the voters adopt a joint rule under which the reelection outcomes
are positively correlated: the incumbents are more likely to be reelected together or dismissed
together than they are to receive opposite rewards. Thus, the next state is more likely to
be S. If the politicians are currently members of di¤erent parties (state D), then the voters
use a joint rule under which the reelection outcomes are negatively correlated. Thus, it is
more likely that one incumbent will be dismissed while the other is reelected, and again the
next state is more likely to be S than D. To conrm this intuition, in Figure 2.3 I depict the
politiciansreelection outcomes under equilibrium rules M and 

G in the two-dimensional
space of performances pM and pG. The density function of the joint distribution of pM and
pG is symmetric around (aM ; a

G).
Furthermore, independently of the current state, the probability PD that the next state
will be D is decreasing in M and 

G. This probability takes its minimal value of 0 when
M = 

G = 1, and its maximal value of
1
2 when 

M = 

G = 0. Intuitively, the more loyal
politicians are to their parties, the more correlated (positively if S or negatively if D) the
optimal performance evaluation rules. The outcome S is more probable for both current
states, as explained above, so stronger party loyalty just increases the probability of this
outcome.
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How does the current state a¤ect the probability that the next state is state k, k 2 fS;Dg?
First, if politicians prefer incumbents (Si  Di ), then PDD  PSD and PSS  PDS ; although
S is always more likely than D, the next state is more likely to be k if the current state is k.
Intuitively, due to the politicianspreference for incumbents, the politiciansincentives are
more correlated in state S than in state D. The voters are therefore more likely to adopt a
positively correlated reelection rule in S than a negatively correlated rule in D. While both
states are more likely to shift to S in the next period, the S outcome is more likely to occur
if the current state is S. By the same logic, a D outcome is more likely if the current state
is D than if the current state is S.
Second, if politicians prefer newcomers (Si < 
D
i ), then PDD < PSD and PSS < PDS .
Here the politicians incentives are more correlated in state D than in state S. Thus, the
joint reelection rules are more correlated (in absolute value) in state D than in state S. State
S is therefore more likely to occur if the current state is D, while state D is more likely to
occur if the current state is S.
To sum up, in this simultaneous election framework, ticket splitting is less likely than
voting for candidates from the same party, i.e., PD  PS . (Recall that states S and D
occur when the voters did not and did split tickets respectively.) Moreover, the probability
of split-ticket voting depends on ticket splitting in the previous period. If politicians prefer
incumbents, then the voters are more likely to split tickets if in the previous period they also
split tickets:
PDD  PSD if SM  DM and SG  DG :
If politicians prefer newcomers, then the voters are more likely to split tickets if in the previous
period they did not split ticket:
PDD < PSD if SM < 
D
M and 
S
G < 
D
G :
3. Ticket Splitting in a Region with Small Municipalities
In this section I assume that a region consists of n municipalities, and that each is pivotal
for the outcome of the regional election with some small probability. The main insights
and intuitions of the large city case (Section 2) do not change qualitatively. Still, some novel
results arise. This section stresses the novel assumptions and results, referring to the previous
analysis whenever appropriate.
The model is identical to that presented in Section 2, except for the following changes.
The region consists of n municipalities with population shares vi,
Pn
i=1 vi = 1. At the
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beginning of each period the voters in municipality i elect mayor Mi and vote for governor G
in the simultaneous elections. The probability that municipality i is pivotal for the outcome
of the regional election is equal to its population share vi. While in o¢ ce, mayors Mi and
governor G implement policies which are determined by their unobservable e¤orts ai and aG
respectively. The performances pi and pG are observed with independent and unobservable
noises "i and "G respectively:
pi = ai + "i
pG = aG + "G
with "i,"G  N
 
0; 2

, i = 1; :::; n.
Mayor Mi chooses e¤ort ai to maximize her utility, given by
i (ai; aG)  a
2
i
2
=
8<: Pri (ai; aG) + 
S
i PrG (ai; aG)  a
2
i
2 if Si
Pri (ai; aG) + 
D
i (1  PrG (ai; aG))  a
2
i
2 if Di;
where Si and Di denote the states where mayor Mi and governor G are members of the
same party or di¤erent parties as before. This utility function implies that the mayor is
o¢ ce-motivated and prefers the governor to be a politician from the same party. The results
do not change if I extend the mayors partisan preferences to include all other mayors in the
region.
Governor G is also o¢ ce-motivated and loyal to her political party. She prefers to see
members of her own party in all the o¢ ces M1; :::;Mn. However, I assume that a governor
cares more about her partys election chances in larger cities. In other words, the larger
the population of the city, the more the governor wants its mayor to be a member of her
own political party. This assumption reects the idea that party a¢ liation might be of
less importance in smaller municipalities, either because candidates are more likely to run
as independents (or be a¢ liated with a minor party) or because the voters have personal
knowledge of the candidates for mayor o¢ ce. Recall that one of the major roles of political
parties is to provide information about unknown politicians. Formally,
G (a1; :::; an; aG)  a
2
G
2
= PrG (a1; :::; an; aG) + 
S
G
nX
i=1
viIiPri (ai; aG) +
DG
nX
i=1
vi (1  Ii) (1  Pri (ai; aG))  a
2
G
2
:
Ii is the indicator function of state Si, dened as
Ii =
8<: 1 if Si
0 if Di:
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The voters in municipality i care about the politiciansperformances in each period ac-
cording to a linear utility function
pi + pG;
where pi and pG are observable at the end of each period. The voters coordinate in choosing
a linear performance evaluation rule (i; bi) to reward mayor Mi, and a linear rule
 
Gi ; b
G
i

to reward governor G. The probability that mayor Mi is reelected equals
Pri (ai; aG) = P (fpi (ai) + ipG (aG)  big) :
As for the governor, I assume that each municipality i has a probability equal to its population
share vi to be pivotal in the regional election. The probability that governor G is reelected
is therefore additively separable, and equal to a weighted sum of the probabilities of getting
a majority in each municipality. Each municipalitys term is weighted with its population
share:
PrG (a1; :::; an; aG) =
nX
i=1
viP
 
pG (aG) + 
G
i pi (ai)  bGi
	
:
I skip the equilibrium denitions and the discussion, which are analogous to the large city
model in Section 2. Next, I characterize the equilibrium in rule strategies in the case of n
small municipalities.
Proposition 4. There exists an equilibrium in rule strategies
 
i ; 
G
i

i = 1; :::; n, given
by
i =
8<: vi
S
G if Si
 viDG if Di
and Gi =
8<: 
S
i if Si
 Di if Di:
The politiciansequilibrium e¤orts ai ; a

G are equal to
ai =
8>>>>><>>>>>:
1p
2
 
1q
1+(viSG)
2
+
vi(Si )
2q
1+(Si )
2
!
if Si
1p
2
 
1q
1+(viDG)
2
+
vi(Di )
2q
1+(Di )
2
!
if Di
aG =
1p
2
nX
i=1
vi
0@ 1q
1 +
 
Si
2
Ii +
 
Di
2
(1  Ii)
+
vi
 
SG
2
Ii +
 
DG
2
(1  Ii)

q
1 +
 
vi
S
G
2
Ii +
 
vi
D
G
2
(1  Ii)
1A :
The equilibrium analysis and intuition for the case of n small municipalities do not di¤er
qualitatively from the large city case presented in Section 2. The only new prediction is that
the correlation (positive in state Si or negative in state Di) between the optimal reward rules
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for mayor Mi and governor G is stronger in large cities than in small cities. Intuitively, the
larger the municipality, the more the governor wants its mayor to belong to the same party,
so the more correlated the politiciansincentives. As a result, the more the voters correlate
(positively if Si or negatively if Di) the optimal reward rule for mayor Mi with performance
of governor G to motivate the latter to exert higher e¤ort.
I turn now to a dynamic analysis of ticket splitting in small municipalities, which reveals
more novel insights. Consider a municipality that splits tickets in the current period, i.e., the
voters elect a mayor from one party and vote for a governor from the other party. This does
not necessarily imply the election of the citys preferred governor, since each municipality has
only a small probability of swaying the regional election. Thus, ticket splitting in municipality
i does not necessarily result in the stateDi where mayor and governor are members of di¤erent
parties. Note that in the large city model, ticket splitting always leads to state D.
I nd the equilibrium probabilities of transition between the ticket-splitting and non
ticket-splitting states in municipality i. I denote by Yi the state where voters in municipality
i split tickets (Y stands for "yes"), and by Ni the state where voters in municipality i do
not split tickets (N stands for "no"). I denote by qi the probability that the governor who
wins a majority in municipality i is actually elected. In other words, probability qi is equal
to the probability that an incumbent governor gets the majority in municipality i and is
also reelected, plus the probability that an incumbent governor does not get the majority in
municipality i and is not reelected. I now establish the following result.
Proposition 5. The matrix of the equilibrium one-step transition probabilities between
states Ni and Yi is 24PNiNi PNiYi
PYiNi PYiYi
35
where
PNiYi =
1
2
  1


qi arctan
Si + vi
S
G
1  viSi SG
+ (1  qi) arctan 
D
i + vi
D
G
1  viDi DG

PYiYi =
1
2
  1


qi arctan
Di + vi
D
G
1  viDi DG
+ (1  qi) arctan 
S
i + vi
S
G
1  viSi SG

with
qi = 1  1

X
j 6=i
vj arctan
q 
Gi
2
+
 
Gj
2
+
 
Gi 
G
j
2
:
Proposition 5 generalizes the dynamic predictions of the large city case studied in Section
2. In analogy with previous results, the next state is more likely to be non ticket-splitting state
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Ni than ticket-splitting state Yi regardless of the current state, since PYi  12 . Furthermore,
if politicians prefer incumbents (Si  Di and SG  DG), then the municipality is more likely
to split tickets if in the previous period it also split tickets (PYiYi  PNiYi). If politicians
prefer newcomers (Si < 
D
i and 
S
G < 
D
G), then the municipality is more likely to split
tickets if in the previous period it did not split tickets (PYiYi < PNiYi).
The following result arises only in the small-city model. According to Proposition 5, ticket
splitting is more likely to happen in small municipalities than in large ones regardless of the
current state. The probabilities PNiYi and PYiYi are decreasing functions of the population
share vi. Intuitively, a governor cares less about the party a¢ liation of small-town mayors.
As the politiciansincentives are less correlated in small municipalities than in large ones, the
voters adopt less correlated joint performance evaluation rules. As a result, the incumbents
are more likely to be evaluated according to their individual performance, which increases
the probability of ticket splitting.
4. Empirical Illustration
The goal of this section is to illustrate my theoretical model with empirical data on ticket
splitting in Spain. I use an unbalanced panel data set on simultaneous municipal and regional
elections held in Spain in 1983, 1987, 1991, 1995, 1999, 2003 and 2007.10 I nd the following
voting patterns in these data.11
1. The reelection outcomes of a mayor and governor from the same party are positively
correlated. The reelection outcomes of a mayor and governor from di¤erent parties are
negatively correlated.
2. Ticket splitting is less likely than voting for candidates from the same party.
3. Voters are more likely to split tickets if in the previous period they also split tickets.
4. Ticket splitting is more likely in small municipalities than in large ones.
10One might be concerned whether the majoritarian model presented here is applicable to the empirical
context, since Spanish regional elections use a proportional representation system. In response, I stress that in
Spain, the regional leader of the party that gets the most seats in the regional Legislative Assembly is usually
elected as a president of the corresponding autonomous community. As such, ordinary citizens often regard
the regional election as a way of determining the president of their autonomous community, rather than an
election of their representatives.
11To conduct a complete empirical analysis of my framework, I would also need data shedding light on the
politicians party loyalty and perceived performance. To the best of my knowledge, available polls do not
provide such data.
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The predictions of my theoretical model are consistent with these ndings. I describe the
empirical model and its estimation below.
In order to demonstrate the rst point, I use bivariate probit analysis to jointly estimate
the mayors and governors reelection probabilities. I dene git, a binary variable that takes
the value 1 if the governor is reelected in municipality i in period t, and 0 otherwise. By
analogy, mit is a binary variable that takes the value 1 if the mayor is reelected in municipality
i in period t, and 0 otherwise. vi stands for municipality is time invariant population share.
The control variables are xit, regional e¤ects are r (r is the region to which municipality i
belongs), and year e¤ects are t. A detailed description of the data and precise denitions of
these variables can be found in the Appendix. The theoretical model suggests the following
estimating equation:
P (git = 1;mit = 1jvi; xit; r; t) = (4.1)
2 (0 + 1vi + 2xit + r + t; 0 + 1vi + 2xit + r + t; ) ;
where 2 () denotes the cumulative function of the bivariate normal distribution, and  is the
tetrachoric correlation between git andmit. The region e¤ects and year e¤ects are included as
dummies. Since the specication does not include any time invariant unobserved municipality
e¤ects that could be correlated with the explanatory variables, I can estimate the model by
pooling all the cross sections.12
To properly apply my framework, I condition equation (4.1) to two subsamples: munici-
palities whose mayor and governor are a¢ liated with the same political party at the beginning
of period t (i.e., before election t), and municipalities where the politicians are from di¤erent
parties. I split the sample and estimate model (4.1) for these two subsamples.
Table 4.1 summarizes the estimated tetrachoric correlations between git and mit. The
rst regression includes only region dummies. The second regression includes both region
and year dummies. The third regression includes only year dummies.
In the subsample where mayor and governor are a¢ liated with the same political party, the
correlation  is signicantly positive in all specications. In the subsample where politicians
are a¢ liated with di¤erent political parties,  is signicantly negative in all specications. I
conclude that in agreement with my theoretical results, the reelection outcomes of politicians
from the same party are positively correlated while the reelection outcomes of politicians
from di¤erent parties are negatively correlated.
12Fixed time invariant e¤ects at the municipality level do not seem realistic over such a long period.
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P (mayor and governor are reelected in i at t) =
P (git= 1;mit= 1)
(1) (2) (3)
The politicians are a¢ liated with the same party before election t.
Correlation,  0.783 0.790 0.766
(0.059) (0.057) (0.041)
Observations 2434 2434 2434
The politicians are a¢ liated with di¤erent parties before election t.
Correlation,  -0.790 -0.791 -0.780
(0.029) (0.023) (0.026)
Observations 1749 1749 1749
Robust standard errors clustered by region (in (1) and (2)) and by year (in (3)) in parentheses.
S ign icant at 10% -

; 5% -

; 1% -

(1) - on ly region dumm ies; (2) - reg ion dumm ies and year dumm ies; (3) - on ly year dumm ies.
Table 4.1: Tetrachoric correlations  between git and mit.
To demonstrate points 2-4 on page 22, I estimate the probability of ticket splitting. Here
I apply the binary response model, which employs a probit link function. A logit model
yields the same qualitative results. However, the probit model is more consistent with my
theoretical framework, where reelections are determined by normally distributed noise.
I denote by yit a binary variable that takes the value 1 if municipality i splits tickets in
period t, and 0 otherwise. As before, vi stands for municipality is population share, xit for
the control variables, r for region e¤ects, and t for year e¤ects. The data and variables are
described in more detail in the Appendix. I estimate the following equation:
P (yit = 1jvi; yit 1; xit; r; t) =  ('0 + '1vi + '2yit 1 + '3xit + r + t) ; (4.2)
where  () denotes the cumulative function of the standard normal distribution. The region
e¤ects and year e¤ects are included as dummies. I capture the dynamic nature of ticket
splitting by introducing the lagged dependent variable, and estimate the model by pooling
all the cross sections.
Table 4.2 presents the coe¢ cients of interest in the panel regression (4.2), which estimates
the probability of ticket splitting. The rst regression includes only region dummies. The
second regression includes both region and year dummies. In the third regression, the region
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P (ticket splitting in i at t) = P (yit= 1)
(1) (2) (3)
Pop. share, '1 -2.544
 -2.616 -2.793
(1.332) (1.309) (1.456)
TS in t  1, '2 0.734 0.734 0.741
(0.043) (0.043) (0.04)
Observations 4183 4183 4177
Robust standard errors clustered by region in parentheses. S ign icant at 10%

; 5%

; 1%

(1)  only region dumm ies; (2)  region dumm ies and year dumm ies; (3)  region-year dumm ies.
Table 4.2: Ticket splitting (TS) and municipality population share.
obs. mean std. dev. min max std. err. 95% conf. intervalbP (yit = 1) 4183 0.193 0.106 0.006 0.487 0.002 0.190 0.196
Table 4.3: Summary statistics of the predicted probability of ticket splitting bP (yit = 1).
dummies are interacted with each year dummy.
First, consider coe¢ cient '1 for the population share. It is signicantly negative in all
specications. I conclude that ticket splitting is more likely to occur in smaller municipalities,
as predicted. Second, coe¢ cient '2 for the e¤ect of ticket splitting in the previous period is
signicantly positive in all specications. This result shows that in the sample ticket splitting
is more likely in municipalities where the voters split tickets in the previous period.
Finally, Table 4.3 presents summary statistics of the predicted probability of ticket split-
ting bP (yit = 1) in the regression (4.2), which includes both region and year dummies. The
maximal predicted probability does not exceed 0.5 and is equal to 0.487. So I conclude that
ticket splitting is less likely than partisan voting.
5. Conclusion
This paper applies an implicit incentive approach to study split-ticket voting in simultaneous
municipal and regional elections. In a political agency model with moral hazard, ticket
splitting is a natural outcome of the optimal implicit reward schemes that voters use to
motivate the politicianse¤orts.
I assume that the incentives of local and regional politicians are correlated, as a mayor/governor
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prefers her counterpart (the governor/mayor) to be a¢ liated with the same political party.
Voters are therefore better o¤ adopting a joint performance evaluation rule rather than an
individual performance evaluation rule when deciding whether to reward the incumbents.
Under a joint rule, I have shown that the reelection outcomes of politicians from the same
party should be positively correlated while the reelection outcomes of politicians from dif-
ferent parties are negatively correlated. Furthermore, the adoption of a joint rule a¤ects
the dynamics of split-ticket voting. In particular, the model suggests that ticket splitting
is less likely than voting for candidates from the same party. Moreover, the probability of
split-ticket voting depends on ticket splitting in the previous period. Finally, ticket splitting
is more likely in smaller municipalities, where the party a¢ liation of a mayor is assumed to
be less important to the governor. These theoretical results are consistent with empirical
evidence from simultaneous municipal and regional elections held in Spain.
I have focused on single task policies. However, in reality public policies pursue many
goals. So it is of interest to study split-ticket voting under a more realistic assumption of
multiple-task policy where the problem of e¤ort allocation among tasks can create policy
trade-o¤s. To rene the empirical results, one could apply other estimation methods such as
a Markov switching model. It would also be interesting to examine data from other countries
where municipal and regional elections are held simultaneously. I leave these tasks for future
research.
Appendix
Throughout the Appendix, I use F to denote the normal distribution function and f for
the corresponding density.
A. Proof of Proposition 1
Under linear performance evaluation rules (i; bi) the probability of being reelected for o¢ ce
i is
Pri (ai; aj) = P (f"i + i"j  bi   ai   iajg) = 1  F"i+i"j (bi   ai   iaj) ;
where noises "i and "j (i; j 2 fM;Gg, i 6= j) are independent normally distributed random
variables, so by the convolution formula "i + i"j  N
 
0;
 
1 + 2i

2

. Politician is utility
is
i (ai; aj)  a
2
i
2
=
26
8><>:
1  F"i+i"j (bi   ai   iaj) + Si

1  F"j+j"i
 
bj   aj   jai
  a2i2 if S
1  F"i+i"j (bi   ai   iaj) + Di F"j+j"i
 
bj   aj   jai
  a2i2 if D:
The rst-order conditions with respect to actual e¤ort ai, taking bi = aei + ia
e
j and bj =
aej + ja
e
i as given, are8<: f"i+i"j (bi   ai   iaj) + 
S
i jf"j+j"i
 
bj   aj   jai
  ai = 0 if S
f"i+i"j (bi   ai   iaj)  Di jf"j+j"i
 
bj   aj   jai
  ai = 0 if D:
Imposing the equilibrium requirement ai = aei yields
aei =
8>>>>><>>>>>:
1p
2
 
1p
1+2i
+
Si jq
1+2j
!
if S
1p
2
 
1p
1+2i
  
D
i jq
1+2j
!
if D;
which completes the proof.
B. Proof of Proposition 3
The reelection of incumbent i is determined by random variable "i+i"j  N
 
0;
 
1 + 2i

2

,
i; j 2 fM;Gg, i 6= j. The density function of bivariate normal distribution of random variables
"M + M"G and "G + G"M , denoted by f"M+M"G;"G+G"M (x; y), is
f"M+M"G;"G+G"M (x; y) =
1
22
q
(MG   1)2
exp
(
 (x  yM )
2 + (y   xG)2
22 (MG   1)2
)
:
The transition from state k back to state k, k 2 fS;Dg, occurs either when both incum-
bents are reappointed or when none of them is reappointed (so, opponents from rival parties
are elected). Denote by pi = a

i + "i the performance of politician i in equilibrium. The
equilibrium transition probabilities are
PSS = P
 
pM + 
S
Gp

G  aM + SGaG
	 \ pG + SMpM  aG + SMaM	+
P
 
pM + 
S
Gp

G < a

M + 
S
Ga

G
	 \ pG + SMpM < aG + SMaM	 =
P
 
"M + 
S
G"G  0
	 \ "G + SM"M  0	+
P
 
"M + 
S
G"G < 0
	 \ "G + SM"M < 0	 =
+1Z
0
+1Z
0
f"M+SG"G;"G+
S
M"M
(x; y) dxdy +
0Z
 1
0Z
 1
f"M+SG"G;"G+
S
M"M
(x; y) dxdy =
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1
2 +
1
 arctan
SM+
S
G
1 SMSG
PDD = P
 
pM   DGpG  aM   DGaG
	 \ pG   DMpM  aG   DMaM	+
P
 
pM   DGpG < aM   DGaG
	 \ pG   DMpM < aG   DMaM	 =
P
 
"M   DG"G  0
	 \ "G   DM"M  0	+
P
 
"M   DG"G < 0
	 \ "G   DM"M < 0	 =
+1Z
0
+1Z
0
f"M DG"G;"G DM"M (x; y) dxdy +
0Z
 1
0Z
 1
f"M DG"G;"G DM"M (x; y) dxdy =
1
2   1 arctan
DM+
D
G
1 DMDG
PSD = 1  PSS = 12   1 arctan
SM+
S
G
1 SMSG
PDS = 1  PDD = 12 + 1 arctan
DM+
D
G
1 DMDG
;
where arctan () is an arctangent function.
C. Proof of Proposition 4
Under linear performance evaluation rules (i; bi) and
 
Gi ; b
G
i

, i = 1; :::; n, mayor Mis
utility is
i (ai; aG)  a
2
i
2
=8><>:
1  F"i+i"G (bi   ai   iaG) + Si
Pn
j=1 vj

1  F"G+Gj "j

bGj   aG   Gj aj

  a2i2 if Si
1  F"i+i"G (bi   ai   iaG) + Di
Pn
j=1 vjF"G+Gj "j

bGj   aG   Gj aj

  a2i2 if Di:
The rst-order conditions with respect to actual e¤ort ai, taking bi = aei + ia
e
G and b
G
j =
aeG + 
G
j a
e
j as given, are8><>:
f"i+i"G (bi   ai   iaG) + Si viGi f"G+Gi "i

bGj   aG   Gj aj

  ai = 0 if Si
f"i+i"G (bi   ai   iaG)  Di viGi f"G+Gi "i

bGj   aG   Gj aj

  ai = 0 if Di:
I impose the equilibrium requirements ai = aei and aG = a
e
G to get mayor Mis equilibrium
e¤ort strategy
aei =
8>>><>>>:
1p
2

1p
1+2i
+
Si vi
G
ip
1+G2i

if Si
1p
2

1p
1+2i
  Di viGip
1+G2i

if Di:
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Next, consider governor Gs utility:
G (a1; :::; an; aG)  a
2
G
2
=
nX
j=1
vj

1  F"G+Gj "j
 
bGj   aG   Gj aj

+
SG
nX
j=1
Ijvj

1  F"j+j"G
 
bj   aj   jaG

+ DG
nX
j=1
(1  Ij) vjF"j+j"G
 
bj   aj   jaG
  a2G
2
:
The rst-order condition with respect to actual e¤ort aG, taking bj = aej + ja
e
G and b
G
j =
aeG + 
G
j a
e
j as given, yields
nX
j=1
vjf"G+Gj "j
 
bGj   aG   Gj aj

+ SG
nX
j=1
Ijvjjf"j+j"G
 
bj   aj   jaG
 
DG
nX
j=1
(1  Ij) vjjf"j+j"G
 
bj   aj   jaG
  aG = 0:
Imposing the equilibrium requirements aj = aej (j = 1; :::; n) and aG = a
e
G yields governor
Gs equilibrium e¤ort strategy
aeG =
1p
2
nX
j=1
vj
0@ 1q
1 + G2j
+
j
 
SGIj   DG (1  Ij)
q
1 + 2j
1A :
Finally, maximizing aei +a
e
G with respect to i and 
G
i yields an equilibrium in rule strategies 
i ; 
G
i

and politiciansequilibrium e¤orts ai = a
e
i
 
i ; 
G
i

and aG = a
e
G
 
i ; 
G
i

, which
completes the proof.
D. Proof of Proposition 5
The matrix of the equilibrium one-step transition probabilities between states Ni and Yi
equals 24PNiNi PNiYi
PYiNi PYiYi
35 =
24qiPSiNi + (1  qi)PDiNi qiPSiYi + (1  qi)PDiYi
qiPDiNi + (1  qi)PSiNi qiPDiYi + (1  qi)PSiYi
35
Refer to the proof of Proposition 3 to nd transition probabilities to states Ni and Yi from
states Si and Di:
PSiNi =
1
2 +
1
 arctan
Si +vi
S
G
1 viSi SG
and PSiYi =
1
2   1 arctan
Si +vi
S
G
1 viSi SG
PDiNi =
1
2 +
1
 arctan
Di +vi
D
G
1 viDi DG
and PDiYi =
1
2   1 arctan
Di +vi
D
G
1 viDi DG
:
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Next,
qi = P (fG gets majority in ig \ fG is reelectedg)+
P (fG does not get majority in ig \ fG is not reelectedg) =
2
nX
j=1
vjP
 
pG + 
G
i p

i  aG + Gi ai
	 \ pG + Gj pj  aG + Gj aj	 =
2
nX
j=1
vjP
 
"G + 
G
i "i  0
	 \ "G + Gj "j  0	 =
vi + 2
X
j 6=i
vj
+1Z
0
+1Z
0
f"G+Gi "i;"G+Gj "j
(x; y) dxdy;
where f"G+Gi "i;"G+Gj "j (x; y) is the density function of bivariate normal distribution of
random variables "G + Gi "i and "G + 
G
j "j . Finally,
qi = vi +
X
j 6=i
vj

1  1

arctan
q 
Gi
2
+
 
Gj
2
+
 
Gi 
G
j
2
=
1  1

X
j 6=i
vj arctan
q 
Gi
2
+
 
Gj
2
+
 
Gi 
G
j
2
;
which completes the proof.
E. Data Description
In Spain, local municipal and regional elections occur simultaneously every four years in 13
out of 17 regions (the so-called autonomous communities).13 The two leading parties are
Partido Popular (PP) and Partido Socialista Obrero Español (PSOE).14 To build the data
set I use the aggregate election results of 10 Spanish regions, which are partially available
online at the o¢ cial websites of the regional governments and the Spanish Ministry of the
Interior.15
13Municipal and regional elections take place simultaneously in Aragon, Principality of Asturias, Balearic
Islands, Canary Islands, Cantabria, Castile-La Mancha, Castile and León, Extremadura, La Rioja, Community
of Madrid, Region of Murcia, Foral Community of Navarre and Valencian Community. In Andalusia, Basque
Country, Catalonia and Galicia, municipal and regional elections are held on di¤erent dates.
14There are also several minor parties; for example, Izquierda Unida has considerable support in some
regions.
15Some data were kindly provided by the statistical institutes of the corresponding regions, and are available
upon request. The community of Castile and León is not included in my analysis because the data on regional
elections in this community are not available. The Canary Islands and the Foral Community of Navarre are
not included in the data set, because local parties apart from PP and PSOE enjoy widespread support in
these regions and the theoretical model assumes just two political parties.
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The sample consists of 3218 municipalities, and depending on the region, covers from 4
to 7 election years from 1983 to 2007. Initially, each observation (of municipality i in election
year t) includes a census, the number of abstainers, the votes for PP, the votes for PSOE,
and the votes for other parties in both municipal and regional elections.
In the theoretical analysis I assumed that all voters participate in both municipal and
regional elections. To meet this requirement, from the initial sample I discard all observations
where the number of voters in municipal elections di¤ers signicantly from the number of
voters in regional elections (the maximum allowable di¤erence is 5%).16 This ensures that
almost the same electorate participated in both elections. Next, I exclude all observations
where a third party obtained more votes than either PP or PSOE, in either the municipal or
regional elections. All observations thus have the same two leading parties, in line with the
theoretical model.
Then I dene the binary variable git such that git = 1 if a candidate who obtained the
largest number of votes in the regional elections in municipality i in period t is a¢ liated with
the same political party as the governor of the corresponding region in period t   1, and
git = 0 otherwise. By analogy, the binary variable mit is dened as follows: mit = 1 if in
municipality i a mayor elected in period t is a¢ liated with the same political party as the
mayor in period t   1, and mit = 0 otherwise.17 Moreover, I dene the binary variable yit
such that yit = 1 if di¤erent parties obtained the largest number of votes in the municipal
and regional elections in municipality i in period t (ticket splitting) and yit = 0 if the same
party received the largest number of votes in both elections (no ticket splitting). I use the
census share of municipality i in a region during the last observed election year as a proxy
for the population share vi. The per capita GDP by province (in thousands of euros) serves
as the control variable xit.18 Table E.1 and Figure E.1 provide descriptive statistics and
characteristics of the nal sample.
16The results for other thresholds of allowable di¤erence, available upon request, are qualitatively the same.
17Note that, in line with the theoretical model, the binary variables git and mit take value 1 when a party
(rather than a particular politician) is reelected in the corresponding elections. Moreover, the data set only
includes the candidatesparty labels (and not their names).
18 In Spain, provinces are administrative subdivisions of autonomous communities. In turn, municipalities
are subdivisions of provinces.
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Figure E.1: Percentage of split-ticket voting (ST) in the regions included in the sample.
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